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INTRODUCTION
Currently, slightly over one percent of civil cases in the federal courts
go to trial.1 While some cases are dismissed or disposed of at the motion to
dismiss or summary judgment stage, a large number are resolved by means
of a settlement agreement. From time to time, disputes arise between parties
regarding the formation, interpretation, and enforcement of those settlement
agreements.2 These disputes can raise a variety of legal and factual issues
that require a ruling by the courts. The first of these issues is whether the
federal court has jurisdiction over the dispute.3 Assuming the federal court
1

JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 172 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf (detailing that of the 309,361
civil cases in federal courts that were terminated during a twelve-month period ending in 2010, only
1.1% of them were terminated by trial); see also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of
Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004)
(“The portion of federal civil cases resolved by trial fell . . . to 1.8 percent in 2002 . . . .”).
2
A Lexis search performed in January 2012 for opinions published by Illinois federal courts in
2011 addressing conflicts of the validity, enforcement, or effect of settlement agreements returned fiftythree results, thirty-eight of which were directly relevant to this Article. The search was performed in the
“IL Federal District Courts” database, and the search terms were: “settlement /s enforce! and date
geq(1/1/11) and date leq(12/31/11).”
3
See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994) (explaining that a
federal district court can retain jurisdiction over a settlement agreement by incorporating the terms of the
settlement in the dismissal order or by expressly retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement in the
dismissal order). But see Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2002), where the
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has jurisdiction, the next question a judge must resolve—and the focus of
this Article—is whether state or federal law governs the settlement
enforcement proceeding.4 Despite being such a basic issue, the Supreme
Court has not addressed it, the circuits are split on the answer, and the case
law fails to employ any meaningful analytical framework. Given the
pervasive nature of settlements in the federal courts, uniform federal choice
of law principles in settlement enforcement proceedings would assist the
parties and the federal courts when disputes arise.
This Article addresses the choice of law issue in settlement
enforcement proceedings. A settlement enforcement proceeding can arise
from a federal case in which the basis of federal jurisdiction was federal
question jurisdiction, diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, or a combination
of federal question claims and supplementary state law claims. This Article
focuses on all cases brought on the basis of federal question jurisdiction,
including those that have supplementary state law claims.5 For such cases,
there is a threshold issue of whether federal or state law governs a
settlement enforcement proceeding.
Where the underlying claim is based on federal question jurisdiction,
the current state of the law is unclear as to whether federal or state law
controls a settlement enforcement proceeding. There are no statutes or
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that address this issue; it is a matter of
federal choice of law. The circuits, however, are split as to the proper
approach.6 Additionally, the circuits provide very little analysis as to why
they choose to apply either federal or state law.7 Supreme Court doctrine on
federal common law is conceptually difficult and most circuits generally
Seventh Circuit held that a district court’s statement retaining jurisdiction over a settlement agreement
was irrelevant to whether it actually retained jurisdiction, a statement that was inconsistent with the
holding in Kokkonen. See Morton Denlow, Federal Jurisdiction in the Enforcement of Settlement
Agreements: Kokkonen Revisited, 1 FED. CTS. L. REV. 345, 357–58 (2006).
4
This Article uses the term “settlement enforcement proceeding” as a catchall for any context
where a party seeks to enforce a settlement agreement, be it via motion when the original action is still
before the federal court or a separate enforcement action after the original suit has been dismissed.
When the context in which the enforcement proceeding arises changes the analysis, it will be noted.
5
The question of what law should apply in diversity cases is beyond the scope of this Article. In a
case brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, the federal court is to apply state law. Thus,
there is a stronger argument that the law of the state under which the case would otherwise be decided
should govern any settlement disputes, as opposed to cases in which federal law would otherwise
govern. This Article does not take a position on what law should apply to settlement enforcement
disputes in diversity cases, but acknowledges that a different analysis would be required.
6
See, e.g., Chaganti & Assocs., P.C. v. Nowotny, 470 F.3d 1215, 1221 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying
state contract law to resolve a motion to enforce a settlement revolving around the issue of whether a
valid settlement agreement existed); Pereira v. Sonia Holdings, Ltd. (In re Artha Mgmt., Inc.), 91 F.3d
326, 329 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that federal contract law governs the enforcement proceeding,
specifically the scope of an agent’s authority to bind a party to a settlement).
7
See, e.g., Mich. Reg’l Council of Carpenters v. New Century Bancorp, Inc., 99 F. App’x 15, 21
(6th Cir. 2004) (stating, without explanation, that Michigan contract law governed the validity of a
settlement agreement where the original complaint alleged a federal securities law violation).
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avoid the issue. When the circuits do provide an analysis, they usually
ignore the relevant Supreme Court precedent8 and cite cases that are
similarly deficient in reasoning.9
Settlements resolving federal question cases can involve any number of
parties. As the number of parties increases, the possibility of disputes
arising from the settlement process can also multiply. These settlements are
reached in a variety of forums—in front of a judge, in private mediation, or
in direct negotiations between the parties. Each path to settlement is
common and may raise particular issues in enforcement disputes. It is not
unusual for a federal question case pending in one state to involve out-ofstate parties and be settled by a mediator in another jurisdiction. Across-theboard application of state law is problematic on a practical level because it
can raise a host of choice of law questions, such as: (1) where the case is
brought, (2) where the settlement is made, (3) how to handle settlements of
international disputes and litigation between states, and (4) what to do if the
federal government is a party. These choice of law issues simply complicate
matters. With the increasing prevalence of settlement agreements as the
means of resolving federal cases, it is time the circuits and, ultimately, the
Supreme Court, reexamine this important issue to provide clarity and reason
to the choice of law in settlement enforcement proceedings.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this particular subject,
several cases provide a general framework for determining whether federal
common law should apply to an issue. Modern Supreme Court doctrine is
skeptical of federal common law as the source of rules of decision.10 As a
result, the Court restricts its application to a very limited number of
contexts where uniquely federal interests are implicated or Congress
otherwise authorizes the use of federal common law.11 A precondition for
the use of federal common law is that there must be a “significant conflict”
between the use of a state law rule of decision and the federal policy or
interest at stake.12

8

See, e.g., Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 220 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that federal law
controls settlement enforcement proceedings where the underlying claim is brought pursuant to a federal
statute without citing to or analyzing the issues made relevant by Supreme Court cases related to federal
common law, such as Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997)).
9
See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 235 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that New
Mexico state law controls the enforceability of settlements, but citing Carr v. Runyan, 89 F.3d 327, 331
(7th Cir. 1996), which traces back to case law that actually applied federal law to a settlement
enforcement dispute); see also infra note 163 (detailing the authorities implicated by McCall).
10
See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Ultimate Independence of the Federal Courts: Defying the
Supreme Court in the Exercise of Federal Common Law Powers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 425, 453 (2004).
11
See generally id. at 434–53 (discussing the state of modern Supreme Court federal common law
doctrine).
12
See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218; O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1994); Kamen
v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991).
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Despite these general principles, there are a number of issues that
remain unclear in application. Primary among these is the scope of the
prerequisite “uniquely federal interest” sufficient to justify the creation of
federal common law. The Supreme Court has at times emphasized the very
limited nature of this category,13 while expanding it at other times.14 Also
among the gray areas are the contours of the significant conflict analysis. In
particular, when does a conflict between a federal interest or policy and the
use of state law become sufficiently significant to justify the use of federal
common law rather than state law as a rule of decision? And what factors
should a court consider when conducting this conflict analysis?
Ultimately, federal common law should provide the rules of decision
for settlement enforcement proceedings where the underlying claim is based
on federal question jurisdiction. The federal courts have an institutional
interest in creating uniform rules to govern behavior in the courts. Such
uniformity would preserve the independence of the courts and conform to
their self-regulating nature. Additionally, there is a separate, yet strong,
federal interest in promoting the settlement of federal lawsuits and
enforcing valid settlements that supports a federal common law of
settlements.15 Varying state law contract principles have the potential to
undermine the settlement process. When such a rule creates a significant
conflict with the federal policy of promoting settlements, the displacement
of state contract law in favor of federal common law is justified and
appropriate.16 Lastly, there may be even more federal statute-specific
policies that require the use of federal common law when the underlying
claims in a settlement are based on that statute.
Of course, leaving this choice of law issue up to the federal courts is
not the only way of handling the problem. The parties to a settlement could
always include a clause in their agreement specifying the choice of law in
the event a dispute should arise. Congress could also pass a statute
resolving this issue for all federal question claims.17 Additionally, the Rules
Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States could suggest to
the Supreme Court one or more Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to govern
the settlement process.18 But assuming none of these actions are taken,
resolving this problem remains in the hands of the federal courts.
13

See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981).
See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–06 (1988).
15
See, e.g.¸ GET, LLC v. City of Blackwell, 407 F. App’x 307, 318 (10th Cir. 2011) (noting a
federal policy in favor of settlement in federal courts); Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1369
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (same).
16
See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218.
17
An even less likely resolution of this issue would come if Congress specified in any given statute
whether federal or state law should govern any settlements of claims brought under that statute.
18
The issues of whether this action would be valid under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2071–2077 (2006), and whether the Rules Committee would be likely to take such action are outside
the scope of this Article, but would be an interesting topic for further discussion.
14
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This choice of law problem is relevant for the day-to-day settlement of
federal litigation. Part I will first discuss the relevant Supreme Court case
law and then illustrate how the circuits have generally misunderstood the
proper issues informing the choice of law analysis under these cases. Part II
will first argue that the federal courts have an institutional interest in
governing their own affairs sufficient to support the federal common law of
settlements. Then, Part II will describe the other federal interests that
support the use of federal common law in settlement enforcement
proceedings on a more limited basis. The identifiable federal policy in favor
of settlements of federal claims, as well as statute-specific policies, support
the use of federal common law. Part II will explore various arguments as to
why federal common law should control the enforcement of settlements of
federal claims when these other interests and policies are implicated.
I. THE EXISTING ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The Supreme Court has not addressed the choice of law issue in a
settlement enforcement proceeding arising out of federal question claims.
There are, however, several analogous Supreme Court decisions that
provide a general framework for understanding when a court should
consider creating federal common law. Additionally, the subject implicates
complicated issues of federalism and federal policy, issues the circuits
generally avoid discussing. As a result, the circuits are split on whether
state or federal law should control. Ultimately, most circuits resolve the
issue without much analysis, so it is difficult to synthesize the different
positions. To many circuits, the question is settled despite the fact that the
Supreme Court has significantly altered its approach to federal common law
over the last thirty years. This Part will first examine the relevant Supreme
Court case law. A discussion of the state of the circuit court case law
follows.
A. The Presumption Against Federal Common Law
Ever since the Supreme Court’s seminal opinion in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, the federal courts have been on notice that “[t]here is no federal
general common law.”19 The exceptions to this general rule under Erie are
“in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress.”20
The Supreme Court’s position on federal common law has varied since
Erie. The Court has, in fact, created federal common law in areas outside of
constitutional or statutory interpretation21 and recognized certain areas
19

304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
Id.
21
See generally Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218 (describing the existence of “‘federal common law’ in
the strictest sense, i.e., a rule of decision that amounts, not simply to an interpretation of a federal statute
or a properly promulgated administrative rule, but, rather, to the judicial ‘creation’ of a special federal
rule of decision”).
20
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appropriate for federal common law.22 It applied federal common law to the
validity of releases under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),23
only to restrict it thirty years later to two limited situations: where Congress
has conferred power on the courts via statute to develop substantive law and
where a federal rule is necessary to protect a uniquely federal interest.24 The
Court also elaborated on the analysis a court must engage in before
displacing state law with federal common law.25 More recently, the
Supreme Court again restricted federal common law,26 though the doctrine
is far from clear.27 This line of Supreme Court case law on federal common
law, beginning with Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad,
illustrates how the presumption against federal common law has evolved.
In Dice, the Supreme Court considered whether federal or state law
controls the question of whether a document signed by the plaintiff prior to
filing his lawsuit was a valid release of his claims under FELA.28 In
concluding that federal law must determine the validity of releases under
FELA, the Court noted that it was Congress who granted the right to sue
and stated that “[s]tate laws are not controlling in determining what the
incidents of this federal right [to recover against an employer for
negligence] shall be.”29 The Court further reasoned that the federal rights
protected by FELA could be easily defeated if individual states could
determine the available defenses to claims brought under the statute.30
Additionally, the Court considered the uniform application of the statute to
be essential to effectuating its purposes and saw the use of federal law as
the way to achieve such uniformity.31 Releases play an important part in the
administration of a federal act, the Court explained, so their validity must
be determined according to uniform federal law.32 The sweeping language
and reasoning in Dice are characteristic of the period prior to the 1980s that

22

See Paul Lund, The Decline of Federal Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 895, 905–14 (1996).
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952).
24
Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981).
25
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–13 (1988).
26
See, e.g., Atherton, 519 U.S. at 220–21 (holding that no federal interest was at stake because the
various state laws had not prevented the banking industry from thriving); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,
512 U.S. 79, 88–89 (1994) (rejecting the argument that a uniform standard was needed where the issue
would not govern the conduct of the United States and rejecting the argument that there was a federal
interest in not allowing states to insulate attorneys from malpractice liability).
27
See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507–09 (2001) (holding that
federal common law controls the claim preclusive effect in state courts of judgments in federal question
cases in federal court, but not elaborating on principles of federal common law).
28
Dice, 342 U.S. at 360–61.
29
Id. at 361.
30
See id.
31
See id.
32
Id. at 361–62.
23
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was more hospitable to the idea of federal common law than the present
era.33
Starting in 1981, the Court took a narrower view, emphasizing that the
areas in which federal common law may be appropriately used are “few and
restricted.”34 In Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., the
Supreme Court began the modern trend towards limiting the use of federal
common law by identifying specific limited categories within which federal
common law would be justified.35 Texas Industries presented the Supreme
Court with the question of whether a right to contribution was available to a
defendant who had been found liable and was assessed damages under
federal antitrust statutes.36 Since the antitrust laws did not expressly
establish such a right, the Court proceeded to consider whether there was
such a right as a matter of federal common law.37
The Court started with the basic principle announced in Erie that there
is “no federal general common law”38 and added the qualification that there
is a need for such law in “few and restricted” instances.39 The Court
described two essential categories where general federal common law is
permitted: (1) where Congress has given the courts the power to develop
substantive law via statute and (2) where “a federal rule of decision is
‘necessary to protect uniquely federal interests.’”40
The first category was relatively simple in application. A court only
need analyze whether Congress intended to confer the power to create any
common law principles to fill in any gaps in the substantive law.41 The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is an example of a
statute where Congress explicitly intended that the federal courts would
develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISAregulated plans.42 Other statutes, such as the Labor Management Relations
Act43 and the Sherman Act,44 have been read to imply congressional intent

33

See Lund, supra note 22, at 905–15.
Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
35
Id. at 640.
36
Id. at 632.
37
Id. at 639–40.
38
Id. at 640 (quoting Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
39
Id. (quoting Wheeldin, 373 U.S. at 651).
40
Id. (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)).
41
See generally id. at 642–44 (discussing those situations in which Congress has vested the federal
courts with the power to create rules of law governing particular federal statutes).
42
See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 831 (2003); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (describing congressional reports reflecting this sentiment).
43
29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006).
44
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
34
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that federal courts develop federal common law to establish the governing
principles of law in those areas.45
The second category, dealing with uniquely federal interests, requires
more explanation. Areas that implicate these interests include “those
concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate
and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of States or our
relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.”46 Only these areas were
appropriate for federal common law because in all of them either “the
authority and duties of the United States as sovereign are intimately
involved or because the interstate or international nature of the controversy
makes it inappropriate for state law to control.”47
The Court admitted that there was a federal interest in an issue
regarding remedies under the antitrust laws in a general sense. This was
because lawsuits brought under the Sherman Act “supplement[] federal
enforcement and fulfill[] the objects of the statutory scheme.”48
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that this was not the sort of “uniquely federal
interest” requiring a federal rule of decision.49 Interestingly, the Court never
cited or mentioned Dice or its broad language about federal law controlling
the incidents of federal rights. In fact, the Supreme Court has never returned
to Dice on an issue of federal common law in any subsequent case.
Despite the clear language of Texas Industries, later Supreme Court
cases suggest that federal common law is not so limited. In Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp.,50 the plaintiff sued a helicopter manufacturer in federal
court on the basis of diversity, alleging that a defective helicopter door
design caused the death of a marine pilot.51 At issue was whether military
contractors to the government have a “military contractor defense,”
predicated on federal law, to state law design defect product liability
claims.52 The Court began by citing Texas Industries for the proposition that
if there is a uniquely federal interest, courts can apply federal common
law.53 Even though the underlying suit was a private suit between private
parties, the Court found that the impact of such suits on the federal
government was sufficient to implicate “uniquely federal interests.”54 The
Court found that it was appropriate for federal common law to displace

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

See Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 642–43.
Id. at 641 (footnotes omitted).
Id.
Id. at 642.
Id.
487 U.S. 500 (1988).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 506–07.
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state law by providing this “Government contractor” defense.55 Allowing
such suits against manufacturers who provide products to the government
pursuant to procurement contracts would have the effect of raising the price
the company charges the government or deterring companies from
designing government products to the provided specifications.56 In either
case, the interests of the United States are directly affected.57
The Court then recognized that a second level of inquiry was necessary
before displacing state law.58 Federal common law would only control,
despite the federal interest, where there was “a ‘significant
conflict’ . . . between an identifiable ‘federal policy or interest and the
[operation] of state law’ . . . or the application of state law would ‘frustrate
specific objectives’ of federal legislation.”59 The federal interest at stake
might justify using federal common law because of the need for national
uniformity on a particular issue, or it might only justify the use of federal
common law when specific rules of the states were actually in conflict with
the federal interest.60
The Court found the relevant federal policy embodied in the Federal
Tort Claims Act’s discretionary function exception, whereby the federal
government would not be liable for the conduct of employees that
constituted the exercise of a discretionary function or duty.61 This provision
evidenced a federal interest in limiting the costs of tort suits against the
government when those suits would amount to second-guessing
government decisions.62 Suing government contractors had the same effect
as directly suing the government because the government would ultimately
bear the cost through increased contract prices.63 The Court concluded that
any state law that imposes design defect liability on government contractors
providing military equipment presents a significant conflict with this federal
interest and must be displaced.64 In so doing, the Court gave a more
expansive interpretation of the type of uniquely federal interest necessary
for the application of federal common law than Texas Industries did.
The Court again discussed the appropriate reach of federal common
law in Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.,65 answering whether
55

Id. at 507.
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting, respectively, Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S.
63, 68 (1966), and United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)).
60
Id. at 507–08.
61
Id. at 511.
62
See id. at 511–12.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 512.
65
500 U.S. 90 (1991).
56
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federal common law should govern a universal demand requirement for
derivative suits brought under the Investment Corporations Act (ICA).66 The
Court found this question to be easy, holding that it was “clear that the
contours of the demand requirement in a derivative action founded on the
ICA are governed by federal law.”67 This was because the ICA is a federal
statute and “any common law rule necessary to effectuate a private cause of
action under that statute is necessarily federal in character.”68
The Court then proceeded to a second tier of the analysis: whether state
law should provide the content of the federal common law.69 Under this
rule, state law provides the content of federal law except where there is a
need for national uniformity, other analogous statutory schemes embody
policy choices readily applicable to the issue at hand, or the state law would
frustrate the objectives of federal programs.70 While this latter statement
was consistent with prior case law, the Kamen Court continued on to
announce that there is a “particularly strong” presumption that state law
should be incorporated into federal common law “in areas in which private
parties have entered legal relationships with the expectation that their rights
and obligations would be governed by state-law standards.”71 The Court
identified corporation law as one such area.72
One parting note on Kamen is worth considering. Analyzing whether
federal common law controlled the demand-requirement issue under the
ICA, the Court stated that “any common law rule necessary to effectuate a
private cause of action under [a federal statute] is necessarily federal in
character.”73 The idea that federal common law provides any rule necessary
to effectuate a federal cause of action could be read to give federal courts
wide discretion to use federal common law whenever a rule of decision was
tangentially related to a federal lawsuit.
Lower federal courts have generally not read this principle to be an
invitation to create federal common law.74 The Supreme Court has likewise
66

Id. at 92.
Id. at 97.
68
Id.
69
See id. at 98.
70
See id. The more attentive readers will notice that this formulation is slightly different than the
Boyle rule. Boyle held that state law actually controls (rather than providing the content of federal law)
except where there is a significant conflict with a federal interest. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp.,
487 U.S. 500, 507–08 & n.3 (1988). Ultimately, the Court settled on the Boyle formulation, so to pay
this slight change too much attention in the historical analysis would be both unnecessary and confusing.
71
Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 97 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 476–77 (1979); Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson
Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)).
74
See, e.g., Halebian v. Berv, 590 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 2009) (filling gaps in the Investment
Company Act of 1940 with state substantive law); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Forest Grove, Inc., 33 F.3d
284, 290 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that Supreme Court cases counsel against using federal common law to
67
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not returned to this principle and has actually reverted to the Boyle
“significant conflict” rule rather than the two-tiered analysis originally
articulated in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.75 and more recently
applied in Burks v. Lasker and Kamen.76 Additionally, in its most recent
cases, the Supreme Court has imposed rigorous limitations on and raised
the hurdles to using federal common law.
The first case evincing this shift was O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC.77
At issue in O’Melveny was whether federal or state law provided the rule of
decision in a malpractice suit brought by the FDIC—the receiver of a
federally insured bank—against attorneys who advised the bank in a pair of
real estate offerings.78 The FDIC sued O’Melveny & Myers in federal
district court, alleging professional negligence and breach of fiduciary
duty.79 The parties agreed that the FDIC asserted a cause of action created
by California law.80 The attorneys asserted a defense that knowledge of the
conduct of the bank’s controlling officers should be imputed to the bank
and, therefore, to the receiver—the FDIC—so that the receiver would be
estopped from pursuing the tort claims.81 The specific rule of decision at
issue was the imputation of knowledge of corporate officers to the
corporation when those officers act against the corporation’s interest.82 The
question was whether state or federal law would provide the rule.83
The Court began by stating that the argument that federal common law
governed the issue was “plainly wrong” because there is no general federal
common law.84 But the Court’s statement that state law generally “governs
the imputation of knowledge to corporate victims of alleged negligence”
was not the end of the analysis.85 Federal common law could still displace
adjudicate a motion to strike or open a judgment confessed against defendants); Lumpkin v. Envirodyne
Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 458 (7th Cir. 1991) (incorporating state law as the rule of decision rather than
creating federal common law).
75
440 U.S. 715, 718 (1979) (“To resolve this question, we must decide first whether federal or state
law governs the controversies; and second, if federal law applies, whether this Court should fashion a
uniform priority rule or incorporate state commercial law. We conclude that the source of law is federal,
but that a national rule is unnecessary to protect the federal interests underlying the loan programs.
Accordingly, we adopt state law as the appropriate federal rule for establishing the relative priority of
these competing federal and private liens.”).
76
Although, as we will discuss, it is unclear after Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001), whether the current standard is significant conflict or the two-tiered state
law incorporation approach.
77
512 U.S. 79 (1994).
78
Id. at 80–81.
79
Id. at 82.
80
Id. at 83.
81
Id. at 82.
82
Id. at 83.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 84–87.
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California law in its application to the FDIC if there were a significant
conflict between the use of state law and some federal policy or interest.86
The Court returned to the Boyle terminology, considering whether
“displacement of state rules” was justified in this case.87
The Court held that the respondent failed to present any significant
conflict with an identifiable policy or interest.88 The Court rejected claims
that a uniform standard was needed, for the issue would not govern the
primary conduct of the United States.89 Likewise, the Court reasoned that to
allow the avoidance of the uncertainty and additional legal research that
results from variations among states’ laws to qualify as an identifiable
federal interest would open the door to far too many federal common law
rules.90
Even more illuminating is the Court’s firm rejection of the argument
that federal law should control because it would disserve federal interests to
allow California law to insulate attorneys from malpractice, with taxpayers
ultimately bearing the costs.91 The Court described this argument as
representing a dangerous and “facile approach to federal-common-lawmaking,” flawed because it was “untethered to a genuinely identifiable (as
opposed to judicially constructed) federal policy.”92 Asking judges to make
the policy determinations that go into setting a standard for tort liability for
malpractice is to ask them to perform the job that within the federal system
“is more appropriate[] for those who write the laws.”93
After O’Melveny, it is clear that an identifiable federal policy,
preferably embodied in a federal statute as in Boyle,94 is necessary to argue
that a case is “extraordinary”95 enough to warrant a federal common law
rule of decision on a particular issue. One issue that remains unclear is
exactly how to conduct the significant conflict analysis. The Court has
found only once that the asserted federal policy was sufficient, so it rarely
proceeds to the step of analyzing whether there is a conflict that rises to the
level of significant.96 Additionally, O’Melveny shifted away from using
state law as the content of federal law, favoring the idea that state law
controls and federal law merely displaces when there is a significant

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id.
Id. at 87–88.
Id. at 88.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id. (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.41 (1981)).
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988).
O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 89.
See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
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conflict. O’Melveny thus reaffirmed the Court’s continuing hostility to
federal common law rules of decision.
In Atherton v. FDIC,97 the Supreme Court adhered to the O’Melveny
significant conflict standard. The issue in Atherton was whether the conduct
of the officers and directors of a federally chartered, federally insured bank
violated the standard of care they owed to the bank.98 The threshold issue
for the Court was whether federal common law determined the standard of
care or whether the Court should look to state law standards.99 The Court
noted that the decision “to displace state law is primarily a decision for
Congress.”100 The existence of federal statutes related to an area of law at
issue does not imply congressional intent to create federal common law,
“for ‘Congress acts . . . against the background of the total corpus juris of
the states . . . .’”101
The Court then applied the O’Melveny rule that state law applies absent
a “significant conflict” between using state law and some federal policy or
interest.102 The Court next explored whether such a conflict existed in
Atherton. Rejecting the argument that the need for nationwide uniformity is
sufficient without further support, the Court noted that varying state
approaches to corporate governance did not prevent the banking system
from thriving.103 The Court also found little merit to the argument that
federal common law governs the standard of care simply because the banks
are federally chartered, since banks have long been held subject to various
state laws.104 It is clear that a specific conflict or threat to federal interests or
policies is required to justify the adoption of federal common law.105
Atherton thus clarified that in addition to analyzing whether there
exists a clearly identifiable federal policy under O’Melveny, courts will also
examine the state law conflict with that policy. The level to which this
conflict must rise to justify the use of federal common law remains unclear,
but Atherton implied that the courts should require more than just a
theoretical inconsistency. Additionally, Atherton adopted the O’Melveny
displacement-of-state-law framework, providing consistency to choice of
97

519 U.S. 213 (1997).
See id. at 215.
99
See id. at 217–18.
100
Id. at 218 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (internal
quotation mark omitted)).
101
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435 (1953)).
102
Id.
103
See id. at 219–21.
104
See id. at 221–23. That the federal courts settle thousands of cases every year despite having to
use disparate state laws does not necessarily mean that arguments for a uniform federal law of
settlements should be similarly rejected. See infra note 215 and accompanying text for an explanation of
this position.
105
See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 223.
98
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law doctrine. Since Atherton, the Supreme Court has not analyzed the issue
of the proper scope of federal common law as directly and as generally as it
did in that case.106 The circuit courts of appeals currently treat Atherton and
O’Melveny as the leading cases on the issue.107
Nevertheless, it bears mentioning that in Semtek International Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.,108 the Supreme Court found that federal common
law controlled “whether the claim-preclusive effect of a federal judgment
dismissing a diversity action on statute-of-limitations grounds is determined
by the law of the State in which the federal court sits.”109 The facts and
procedural history of Semtek are convoluted and, ultimately, not important
to the federal common law analysis. After rejecting various arguments for
alternative sources of a controlling rule of decision, the Court concluded
that federal common law governs the preclusive effect of federal
judgments.110 The Court reached this decision by analyzing several pre-Erie
cases that had used federal common law to determine the preclusive effect
in state courts of judgments of federal courts on federal question cases.111
Those cases, the Court reasoned, stood for the principle that the Supreme
Court had the final say on how state courts treat federal judgments, which
meant that federal common law must govern issues of claim preclusion.112
The Court then observed that the issue of the preclusive effect of
federal diversity judgments was a “classic case” for adopting state law as
the federal rule.113 The Court rejected the idea that there needed to be a
uniform federal rule, saying that the more persuasive argument for
uniformity is having the same preclusive rule apply whether a state or
federal court dismissed the case.114 The Court clarified, however, that
should state law be incompatible with federal interests, a federal rule would
be justified.115 This last part of the analysis harkens to the significant
conflict test, though mere incompatibility is insufficient under that standard.
Outside of this reminder that federal common law remains limited to
the extent state law can address the issue, Semtek is not particularly helpful
as a federal common law decision. Its analysis, which has been accused of

106

See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 434–53 (describing Supreme Court federal common law
doctrine and ending with Atherton).
107
See, e.g., Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2010)
(analyzing a federal common law issue and citing Atherton and O’Melveny).
108
531 U.S. 497 (2001).
109
Id. at 499.
110
Id. at 508.
111
See id. at 507.
112
See id. at 507–08.
113
Id. at 508.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 509.
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having an “ipse dixit quality” about it,116 did not apply any broader rules on
when federal common law is justified, such as the significant conflict test. It
did not cite other federal common law cases or announce a rule about
federal common law in general.117 As a result, the case does not assist lower
courts in considering whether federal common law should govern
settlement enforcement proceedings of federal question cases. Furthermore,
by returning to the two-tiered approach last seen in Kamen, where the Court
stated that federal common law controls but incorporates state law, the
Court further muddled existing doctrine and made determining the proper
framework more difficult.118 In light of this confusion, it is not surprising
that lower courts have taken Atherton and O’Melveny to be the leading
cases on the issue of federal common law.
The line of cases beginning with Texas Industries and culminating in
Atherton makes it clear that the Supreme Court is generally skeptical
towards federal common law rules of decision in modern choice of law
doctrine. Federal common law is permitted in very few and specific areas of
law, such as admiralty, interstate and international disputes, and in cases
involving the rights and obligations of the United States. If a particular
dispute does not fall into one of these categories, a federal common law rule
of decision will only be used if state law creates a significant conflict with a
clearly identifiable federal policy. While this conflict analysis is the proper
mode of determining choice of law in settlement enforcement proceedings,
the circuit courts have generally failed to apply it in that context.
B. The Circuits Take Their Positions
As this Article’s Introduction suggested, settlements and settlementrelated disputes are not unusual. Thus, it should come as no surprise that the
circuits have all taken a position on whether state or federal law controls a
settlement enforcement proceeding where the underlying claim is based on
federal question jurisdiction. As the last section explained, standards that
govern a federal court’s choice between federal common law and state law
should operate to rein in federal common law. Somewhat surprisingly,
however, only one decision from an appellate court has analyzed the issue

116

Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585,
612 (2006). As a result, even guidance from this case gleaned through factual analogy would be
minimal.
117
See Semtek¸ 531 U.S. at 507–09.
118
Fortunately for our purposes, there is skepticism as to whether the “incompatibility” and
“substantial conflict” tests ever lead to different outcomes. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S.
500, 507 n.3 (1988). The problem is more of an issue on what terminology to use on the one hand, and
what the choice of formulation suggests about the Court’s view of the proper limits on federal common
law. Because the case law at both the Supreme Court level and in the circuits provides much more
analysis with many more examples when using the significant conflict test, that test is the one we will
apply in our analysis.
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under the proper Supreme Court precedent.119 Others neglect to provide any
analysis, misuse authority, or ignore the important issues while treating
largely irrelevant ones as dispositive.120 This section will explore the
different positions taken in the case law and identify common analytical
deficiencies.
The circuits fall into two camps on this choice of law issue, though
each suffers from deficiencies in reasoning or use of precedent. The First,
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have held that federal common law
controls. The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits have all held that state law controls. Only the Second Circuit, in a
single case, has conducted a proper analysis of how the governing Supreme
Court cases might relate to settlement enforcement proceedings, although
the court has since backed off its position. This section will start by
examining this Second Circuit case and then proceed to explain the
shortcomings in the analyses of the other circuit courts.
1. The Lone Example of a Proper Analysis.—The Second Circuit is
the only circuit to properly analyze whether federal or state law would
control a settlement enforcement proceeding where the underlying case was
based on federal claims, albeit in dicta. In Ciaramella v. Reader’s Digest
Association, the Second Circuit recognized the applicability of the Atherton
line of cases to the choice of law in a settlement enforcement proceeding.121
In that case, the plaintiff sued his former employer alleging violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and ERISA.122 Prior to discovery,
the parties negotiated a settlement and the defendant prepared a draft
agreement containing language that the settlement was not final until
executed by all parties and their attorneys.123 After the plaintiff authorized
his original attorney to accept, the plaintiff’s attorney suggested several
revisions to the defendants.124 The defendants accepted those changes and
the plaintiff’s attorney indicated to the defendants, “We have a deal.”125
Meanwhile, the plaintiff consulted with a second attorney about the
settlement, determined that the settlement was not acceptable, and refused
to sign the updated version.126 The defendant then moved to enforce the
settlement.127
The Second Circuit first found that it need not decide the choice of law
issue because there was no material difference between the relevant state
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

See Ciaramella v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 131 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 1997).
See infra Part I.B.2–3.
131 F.3d 320.
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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law and federal common law.128 Under both New York state law and federal
common law,129 parties can settle a case orally even if a future written
memorialization of the terms is contemplated.130 But if the parties do not
intend to be bound until there is a signed, written agreement, an oral
agreement is not binding.131 After discussing these principles, the court
entertained the defendant’s argument that the court ought to exercise its
power to fashion a new federal common law rule that any time both parties’
attorneys agreed on all material terms, an oral settlement would be
binding.132 The court rejected this argument, noting that Atherton required a
significant conflict between the use of state law and federal policy before
departing from state law as the rule of decision.133 The court did not find a
conflict between federal policy and the relevant rule.134 The court noted that
at least one of the statutes at issue expressed a preference for voluntary
settlements of claims.135 The state common law rule was that the oral
agreement at issue was not binding because it was not in writing. The court
found that this rule does not conflict with the federal interest in encouraging
settlements, and actually promotes settlements and gives effect to the intent
of the parties.136 The defendant’s proposed rule—that oral agreements
should be binding—would deter parties from negotiating settlements in fear
of being locked into an agreement they never wanted.137
Because the court did not have to choose between federal and state
law, the choice of law issue in settlement enforcement disputes technically

128

Id. at 322.
The cases the Second Circuit relied upon for its source of federal common law on this topic were
Taylor v. Gordon Flesch Co., 793 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1986) and Board of Trustees v. Vic Construction
Corp., 825 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Ciaramella, 131 F.3d at 322. The Seventh Circuit case
involved a settlement of a Title VII claim and based its authority to create federal common law on a
prior case, Lyles v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 684 F.2d 501, 504 (7th Cir. 1982), that
relied on a Fifth Circuit case, Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir.
1981), whose reasoning is debunked at length below. See Taylor, 793 F.2d at 862; infra notes 138–42
and accompanying text. The district court case involved an ERISA settlement, and the court reasoned,
based on a concurring opinion in an outdated Supreme Court case and a few subsequent (and poorly
reasoned) circuit court cases, that federal common law could be created in that context. Bd. of Trs.,
825 F. Supp. at 464, 465 (citing D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471–72 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring)). The Second Circuit was not, however, necessarily supporting the legitimacy
of those prior courts acting to make federal common law pertaining to the settlement of federal claims,
but merely referring to the existence of such federal common law. See Ciaramella, 131 F.3d at 322.
130
Ciaramella, 131 F.3d at 322.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 322–23.
133
Id. at 323.
134
See id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
See id.
129
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remains open in the Second Circuit.138 Nevertheless, the case is important
because the court appeared to recognize that the Atherton line of Supreme
Court cases governs the choice of law analysis. Prior cases in the Second
Circuit had held that federal common law controlled settlement
enforcement disputes where the underlying claim was based on federal
law.139 The Second Circuit’s willingness to engage in the proper analysis
was a good sign, one that its sister circuits have generally missed.
2. Circuits in Which Federal Law Controls.—A minority of circuits
hold that federal common law controls settlement enforcement proceedings
when the underlying claim is a federal question.140 While this Article and
strong arguments support this position, none of these circuits have
conducted a truly thorough analysis. More specifically, none have applied
the modern standard for the application of federal common law set forth in
the Atherton line of cases. Under the modern standard, a court should
assume that state law provides a rule of decision unless there is a significant
conflict between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the use of
state law.141
The First Circuit uses federal law in settlement enforcement
proceedings where a federal cause of action is the underlying claim.142 The
court now treats the issue as settled, relying on its prior cases. The problem
with this approach is that the Supreme Court’s shift against federal common
law has altered the legal landscape upon which it relies. The First Circuit’s
approach goes back to Malave v. Carney Hospital,143 a case involving a
settlement dispute arising out of federal employment discrimination claims.
The court applied federal law to the settlement enforcement proceedings.144
Providing no further reasoning, the court cited several pre-1990 cases that
predate the Atherton line of cases that solidified the presumption against

138

See Kaczmarcysk v. Dutton, 414 F. App’x 354, 355 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Ciaramella, 131 F.3d
at 322) (“[T]he question of whether New York or federal common law determines whether parties have
reached a settlement is an open question in our Circuit . . . .”).
139
See, e.g., Pereira v. Sonia Holdings, Ltd. (In re Artha Mgmt., Inc.), 91 F.3d 326, 328, 329 (2d
Cir. 1996) (applying federal law where the underlying case arose under the Bankruptcy Code); Fennell
v. TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498, 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying federal law where the underlying
case arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). These previous cases can be traced back to a line of cases from
other circuits that were predicated on an understanding of the role of federal common law that had
drastically changed by the time Atherton came down in 1997. These cases required reexamination after
the modern trend against federal common law became clear.
140
This includes the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, though it is not entirely clear that the
Fourth Circuit still adheres to this view, as discussed below. See infra note 147.
141
Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997).
142
See Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 246 F.3d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 2001).
143
170 F.3d 217, 220 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Quint, 246 F.3d at 14 (applying federal law and
citing Malave as its binding authority).
144
See Malave, 170 F.3d at 219–20.
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federal common law.145 The cases cited by the First Circuit did not support
the position that federal law controls all settlement enforcement
proceedings where the underlying claim is federal in nature.146
The Third, Fifth, and, at times, the Fourth147 Circuits take similar
positions and support them with cases and reasoning inconsistent with
modern Supreme Court doctrine. The Third Circuit’s shortcomings stem
from a case that relied on an inapposite Supreme Court decision to support
the proposition that federal law controls settlement agreements where the

145

See id. at 220. Those four cases are Michaud v. Michaud, 932 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1991); Fennell v.
TLB Kent Co., 865 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1989); Mid-S. Towing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc., 733 F.2d 386 (5th
Cir. 1984) (a maritime law case); and Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112 (4th
Cir. 1983).
146
The Fennell case no longer appears to control in the Second Circuit, as that court has recognized
the impact of the Atherton line of cases. See Ciaramella v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 131 F.3d 320, 322–23
(2d Cir. 1997). As for the First Circuit case that the Malave court relied on, Michaud, it was brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Michaud, 932 F.2d at 78. Section 1983 is unique in that a second statute,
42 U.S.C. § 1988, explicitly requires that courts first look to federal law on all matters pertaining to
§ 1983 suits. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2006). If federal law is deficient, a court should look to state law
to fill in the gaps. See id. (“The jurisdiction . . . conferred on the district courts by the provisions of [this
Title] for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication,
shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are
suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the
common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court
having jurisdiction . . . is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of
the United States, shall . . . govern . . . .”). While the Michaud case did not explain that this was the basis
for using federal law with respect to that settlement, the case Michaud relied on, Furtado v. Bishop, did
explain the role of § 1988 in the choice of law analysis where § 1983 claims are involved. 604 F.2d 80,
97 (1st Cir. 1979). Because of § 1988’s command, federal common law should control settlement
enforcement proceedings of § 1983 claims. Express statutory authority to create federal common law is
one of the well-founded exceptions to the limitations placed on common law, see Tex. Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981), but the First Circuit has failed to recognize this basis
for distinguishing Michaud.
The other cases the Malave court cited are similarly inapplicable; one was a maritime law case. See
Mid-S. Towing Co., 733 F.2d at 389. Like express statutory exceptions, maritime law is another area
where federal common law is permitted. See Tex. Indus., Inc., 451 U.S. at 641. As for the Fourth Circuit
case it cited, Gamewell, that case no longer appears to be controlling law in that circuit. See, e.g., Moore
v. Beaufort Cnty. N.C., 936 F.2d 159, 162 (4th Cir. 1991).
147
See Gamewell, 715 F.2d at 114. The interesting part of the reasoning of this case was that the
court stated it had the option to use federal common law for “open questions incident to the adjudication
of federal statutory claims.” Id. This position was eroded by subsequent Supreme Court cases and is
inconsistent with contemporary doctrine. See supra notes 77–106 and accompanying text. Later cases in
the Fourth Circuit generally avoid choosing between federal and state law in settlement enforcement
proceedings and no longer cite Gamewell, stating instead that “the controlling factor must in either event
be the intentions of the parties.” Piver v. Pender Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1083 (4th Cir.
1987); see Moore, 936 F.2d at 162. But see Silicon Image, Inc. v. Genesis Microchip, Inc., 271 F. Supp.
2d 840, 848 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that federal law controls settlement enforcement proceeding where
underlying claim is a patent infringement action and citing Gamewell as controlling authority).
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underlying right to sue derives from a federal statute.148 Similarly, the Fifth
Circuit’s leading case, Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.,149 is based on
an outdated Supreme Court decision that is inconsistent with modern
doctrine.150 Fulgence came down in 1981, and its analysis is indicative of
the more relaxed view of federal common law that prevailed at that time.151
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit continues to rely on Fulgence and its
progeny for the rule that federal law controls settlements of federal
claims.152
Generally, circuit decisions holding that federal common law controls
settlement enforcement proceedings where the underlying cause of action is
148

See Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 946 (3d Cir. 1997). Williams v. Metzler involved a
settlement enforcement proceeding where the underlying claim was brought under the federal Energy
Reorganization Act. Id. at 940. On the choice of law issue, the court held that the settlement agreement
at issue involved a right to sue derived from a federal statute, and thus federal common law principles
governed the construction of the contract. Id. at 946. For support, the court cited Town of Newton v.
Rumery, which analyzed the validity of a criminal defendant’s waiver of any § 1983 claims he might
have in return for the prosecution dropping the criminal charges against him. 480 U.S. 386, 391–92
(1987). The defendant ultimately brought a § 1983 action and claimed that the waiver was invalid as
against public policy; the city moved to dismiss on the basis of the prior settlement. Id. The Supreme
Court stated that “[t]he agreement purported to waive a right to sue conferred by a federal statute. The
question whether the policies underlying that statute may in some circumstances render that waiver
unenforceable is a question of federal law.” Id. at 392.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not cite any federal common law cases, nor has it been
cited in subsequent federal common law Supreme Court cases like O’Melveny or Atherton, leading to
the inexorable conclusion that it simply is not to be considered a federal common law case. Furthermore,
there is a fundamental difference between the Rumery waiver scenario and typical settlement
enforcement disputes: in the former the Court is asking whether such a resolution is allowed under the
federal statute, while in the latter the Court is merely interpreting the terms or determining the existence
of the agreement. Therefore, the Third Circuit’s use of Rumery as authority for the use of federal law in
all settlement enforcement proceedings is very tenuous.
149
662 F.2d 1207, 1208 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing the issue as being one of first impression).
150
The court’s analysis begins with the proposition that since it is dealing with a federal statutory
scheme, Title VII, to be precise, that “the federal courts are competent to determine whether a settlement
exists without resort to state law.” Id. at 1209. The only opinion the court cites for this proposition is a
concurring opinion from a 1942 Supreme Court case. See id. (citing D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,
315 U.S. 447, 471–72 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (asserting a federal court’s freedom to create
federal common law when it is related to federal statutes or the Constitution)). The D’Oench case,
however, predates and is inconsistent with the modern Supreme Court law. See Atherton v. FDIC,
519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (“Nor does the existence of related federal statutes automatically show that
Congress intended courts to create federal common-law rules . . . .”).
151
For example, the Fulgence court argues that creation of a federal rule rather than use of a state
rule is appropriate where “the rights of the litigants and the operative legal policies derive from a federal
source.” See Fulgence, 662 F.2d at 1209. This language is clearly more accepting of federal common
law than the Atherton significant conflict analysis.
152
See Macktal v. Sec’y of Labor, 923 F.2d 1150, 1157 n.32 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Fulgence, 662
F.2d at 1209); Liger v. New Orleans Hornets NBA Ltd. P’ship, No. 05-01969, 2010 WL 3952006, at *2
(E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2010) (citing Mid-South Towing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc., 733 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir.
1984), as a case that relies on Fulgence for the proposition that “[w]here the substantive rights and
liabilities of the parties derive from federal law, the enforceability or validity of a settlement agreement
is determined by federal law”).
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federal in nature all suffer from analytical deficiencies. Their rules are
artifacts of a bygone era where federal common law was more pervasive.
Supreme Court precedent has changed its tone towards federal courts
creating federal common law, and these circuits have not adjusted to this
doctrinal shift. These circuits have not clarified whether the use of state law
in these proceedings would present a significant conflict with a federal
policy or interest, the modern threshold for the use of federal common law.
3. Circuits in Which State Law Controls.—Likewise, the majority of
circuits that hold that state law applies to federal question settlement
proceedings have failed to conduct an adequate conflict analysis.153 These
circuits do not adequately entertain the possible federal interests impacted
by their decisions, instead narrowly focusing on the settlement as a contract
between private parties.
Several such circuits have, at times, come close to considering the right
issues in recognizing the modern shift against federal common law. The
Eleventh Circuit in Resnick v. Uccello Immobilien GMBH, Inc. examined
the enforceability of a settlement agreement that required a property owner
to bring its building into compliance with the ADA within 30 days.154 On
the choice of law issue, the Eleventh Circuit held that state contract law
applied.155 The court, using the Supreme Court’s rule from Texas Industries,
maintained that it “disfavor[ed] federal common law” and would apply
federal common law in “only rare instances concerning ‘rights and
obligation[s] of the United States, interstate and international disputes
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign
nations, and admiralty cases.’”156 The Resnick court failed to realize that
Texas Industries was but the beginning of the line of cases explaining when
and how federal common law applies. Post-Atherton, federal common law
also can be created whenever there is a significant conflict between some
federal policy or interest and the use of state law.157 The Resnick court’s
failure to recognize that the use of federal common law was not quite as
limited post-Atherton as compared to Texas Industries resulted in the
application of a rule that was unduly restrictive of federal common law.
There is at least an argument that the ADA embodies significant federal
interests in ensuring the integrity of the rights of disabled persons, policies
153

These circuits include the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.
227 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2000).
155
Id. at 1350 (citing Schwartz v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901, 905 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding
that state law applied to the construction and enforceability of a settlement agreement arising under Title
VII)). The court also issued a general rule that “[p]rinciples governing general contract law apply to
interpret settlement agreements.” Id.
156
Id. at 1350 n.4 (quoting Kobatake v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 162 F.3d 619, 624 n.3
(11th Cir. 1998)).
157
See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997) (citing Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.,
384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
154
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that could feasibly be undermined by the state law rules applied in that case.
However, the Resnick rule precludes analysis of these issues.
The D.C. Circuit has similarly come close to the proper approach with
its fairly thorough analysis in Makins v. District of Columbia.158 This
decision, like Resnick, contains solid analysis recognizing the limitations on
federal common law. But it too erred by requiring explicit statutory
rulemaking authority before a court can create federal common law.159 This
rulemaking authority is not required under present doctrine—federal courts
can create federal common law rules of decision where there is a significant
conflict with a federal policy or interest. Thus, the Makins court unduly
restricted federal common law.
While these courts at least acknowledged Supreme Court precedent,
other courts that have selected state law for settlement enforcement
proceedings have ignored it entirely. One primary example is the Tenth
Circuit in United States v. McCall.160 In McCall, the court examined an
alleged settlement agreement between the Farmers Home Administration
(FmHA) and a farmer over the farmer’s outstanding debt owed to FmHA.161
After settlement negotiations, a dispute arose as to whether a final
agreement had been reached.162 On the choice of law issue, the Tenth
Circuit held that state contract law controlled, merely citing a single case
and providing no further analysis.163
158

277 F.3d 544, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
At issue in Makins was “under what circumstances, if any,” an attorney may bind his client to a
settlement agreement stemming from a Title VII lawsuit without having actual authority from the client.
Id. at 545. The plaintiff, a female employee of the District of Columbia, brought a lawsuit against her
employer, alleging sex discrimination and retaliatory firing in violation of Title VII. Id. In a settlement
conference with a magistrate judge, the parties’ attorneys reached a settlement agreement. Id. The
plaintiff was not physically present but was in contact with her attorney throughout the settlement
conference via cell phone. Id. at 545–46. The plaintiff, however, upon being presented with the written
settlement agreement by her lawyer, refused to sign the agreement and the defendant filed a motion to
enforce the settlement. Id. at 546.
In holding that local law, rather than federal common law, applies to the determination of whether a
settlement should be enforced, the court began by expressing doubt both that the federal courts had
power to formulate law in this area and that there was a need for national uniformity on this issue. Id. at
547–48. The court then endorsed the principle that “neutral state laws that do not undermine federal
interests should be applied unless some statute (or the Constitution) authorizes the federal court to create
a rule of decision.” Id. at 548 (quoting Morgan v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir.
1986)). Further, the court recognized the benefit to members of the bar of knowing that the law
governing the settlements they negotiate will be the same whether they are in a state or federal court. Id.
Noting the lack of a statute permitting lawmaking by the federal courts and the absence of the United
States as a party, the court determined local law was appropriate. Id. at 548.
160
235 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2000).
161
Id. at 1213.
162
Id. at 1213–14.
163
Id. at 1215. That single case is a Seventh Circuit case and is part of a line of authority that
actually traces back to a Fifth Circuit case, which itself cites a Tenth Circuit case that actually applies
federal law to a settlement enforcement dispute. See Carr v. Runyan, 89 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1996).
159
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The Sixth Circuit’s analysis likewise comes up short. In Michigan
Regional Council of Carpenters v. New Century Bancorp, Inc.,164 the Sixth
Circuit considered the enforceability of a settlement agreement of alleged
securities law violations brought by a stock purchaser against a corporation
and its controlling shareholder.165 The court, in holding that the settlement
agreement was enforceable, applied Michigan state contract law.166 The
court neither cited to any authority nor gave any analysis as to why state law
governed the enforcement of this settlement even though the underlying
claims were for violations of federal securities laws.167 Similarly, the
Eighth168 and Ninth169 Circuits have yet to properly analyze the choice of
law in this area. In what is potentially a good sign, however, the Ninth

The Seventh Circuit case law ultimately leads back to a Fifth Circuit case, Florida Education Ass’n v.
Atkinson, 481 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1973). That case also has no analysis, simply stating the rule and citing
Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit cases. See id. at 663. Thus, the case law runs full circle back to a Tenth
Circuit case where the United States was a party and the court actually applied federal law in construing
the settlement agreements. See Homestake-Sapin Partners v. United States, 375 F.2d 507, 511 (10th Cir.
1967).
Questionable basis in law aside, the McCall rule is difficult to understand when considered in light
of Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981). In Texas Industries, the Court
specifically made it clear that one of the very limited areas where federal common law exists is where
the rights and obligations of the United States are at stake. Id. at 641. A settlement of a lawsuit where
the United States is a party would certainly seem to involve the rights and obligations of the United
States. In fact, at least one circuit has recognized this connection. See Makins, 277 F.3d at 548.
164
99 F. App’x 15 (6th Cir. 2004).
165
Id. at 16.
166
Id. at 21 (“As a matter of Michigan contract law, which governs the validity of the settlement
agreement in this case, attorneys are considered to have the apparent authority to settle lawsuits on
behalf of their clients, and opposing parties have the right to rely upon the existence of such settlements
when agreed to by attorneys.”).
167
See id.
168
See, e.g., Sheng v. Starkey Labs., Inc., 53 F.3d 192, 194 (8th Cir. 1995). In that case, a
settlement dispute arose regarding claims under Title VII. See id. at 193. The Eighth Circuit did not even
identify that there was an issue as to whether federal or state law controlled the enforcement proceeding.
See id. at 194. It simply stated that “[s]ettlement agreements are governed by basic principles of contract
law” and proceeded to apply Minnesota law. Id.
169
See, e.g., United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir.
1992). That case involved a settlement dispute where the underlying lawsuit was brought under the
Lanham Act and California state unfair competition law. See id. at 855. The court concluded state law
governed even when the underlying cause of action is federal. Id. at 856. The court provided no further
analysis as to why this is the case, and as authority it cited two cases. Id. The first of these cases gave no
analysis and only relied on a Seventh Circuit case that also gave no analysis of the issue. See Jeff D. v.
Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Ass’n, Local 550
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983)). The second case predated the modern
line of Supreme Court cases and therefore did not apply the federal common law standards set forth in
those cases. See Commercial Paper Holders v. R. W. Hine (In re Beverly Hills Bancorp), 649 F.2d 1329,
1332–33 (9th Cir. 1981) (deciding state law applied to a settlement dispute stemming from a bankruptcy
action and relying solely on the facts that the settlement was not a government contract, nor was it a
consent decree, and that it was “a contract and must be construed under the laws of California”).
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Circuit may be distancing itself from its earlier flawed cases, having
recently suggested that the choice of law question is an open one.170
The Seventh Circuit has also given a very clear ruling on the source of
the rules for settlement enforcement suits where the underlying claim is a
federal lawsuit. In Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc.,171 which involved a
claim for copyright infringement, the court stated that the issue was settled:
state law controlled.172 The court took the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co.173 to imply that state law would
govern all settlement enforcement proceedings brought to enforce the
settlement of a federal suit.174 In Kokkonen, a lawsuit before a federal
district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship settled and was
dismissed with prejudice.175 Later, a dispute arose pertaining to the return of
certain files under the settlement agreement, and one of the parties sought
enforcement of the agreement.176 The Supreme Court found that the district
court lacked jurisdiction over the subsequent suit to enforce the settlement
agreement where the district court overseeing the settlement did not
expressly retain jurisdiction.177 The Lynch court reasoned that if federal law
controlled the enforcement of settlement agreements reached in federal
court, “the suit would arise under federal law and thus be within the
jurisdiction of the federal court” even if diversity were not present.178 The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that, because there was no jurisdiction in
Kokkonen, federal law does not control such actions.179
The problem with this logic is that in Kokkonen all the claims were
state law claims before the court as a matter of diversity of citizenship.180 As
discussed above, there are three jurisdictional bases under which a case can
be before a federal court: federal question jurisdiction, diversity
jurisdiction, or a combination of federal claims and supplemental state law
claims. It could easily be argued that where there is an underlying federal
170

See Ellerd v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 273 F. App’x 669, 670 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to decide
whether federal or state law governed a settlement dispute where the underlying claim was brought
under the Fair Labor Standards Act because the result would be the same). But see Kirkland v. Legion
Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that state law controls settlement enforcement
proceedings for federal class actions and citing Jeff D., 899 F.2d at 759).
171
279 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2002).
172
Id. at 490.
173
511 U.S. 375 (1994).
174
Lynch, 279 F.3d at 489.
175
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376–77.
176
Id. at 377.
177
Id. at 381–82.
178
Lynch, 279 F.3d at 490.
179
Id. Apparently, the diversity jurisdiction that existed for the underlying claim was not met in the
settlement enforcement action, presumably because the controversy was over the return of certain files
rather than monetary. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
180
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376–77.
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law claim that ultimately settles, this settlement is controlled by federal law.
Since Kokkonen only dealt with state law claims, it is distinguishable from
the enforcement of a settlement of federal question claims, or those cases
like Lynch with both federal and state claims.181
The Lynch court necessarily assumed that settlements of federal
question cases and diversity cases should be treated the same for choice of
law purposes. It took a case regarding jurisdiction over the settlement of
state law claims in diversity and found it to imply choice of law principles
for federal question claims. Since the Lynch court did not engage in an
analysis of the relevant considerations of whether federal common law
would be appropriate for federal question claims and instead relied on
Kokkonen, its reasoning is flawed. The use of state law in settlement
enforcement actions where the underlying claim was a federal question
claim is not a logical consequence of Kokkonen.
Regardless of whether a given circuit court of appeals has found
federal or state law to control the enforcement of settlements of federal
claims, the decisions across the circuits do not adequately analyze the
question. Many courts that apply federal law do so on the basis of cases that
were decided in an era of looser standards for federal common law. The
courts that apply state law tend to do so based on arguments that limit
federal common law too much and in doing so fail to sufficiently consider
federal interests that might be affected by the settlement context. The most
important thing is to highlight the need to revisit rules premised on an
outdated understanding of the controlling law. The next Part will explore
the proper contours of the choice of law analysis as it relates to settlement
enforcement proceedings in federal question cases.
II. PROTECTING THE FEDERAL INTEREST IN SETTLEMENTS WITH FEDERAL
COMMON LAW RULES
Despite the varied approaches and conclusions of the circuit courts in
choosing either state or federal law to control settlement enforcement
proceedings, the controlling Supreme Court law is fairly clear. A few basic
propositions are apparent. State law provides the rule of decision unless the
case falls into one of a number of enclaves where federal common law is
permitted. There are a number of such areas that have already been
delineated where federal common law should apply, including international
and interstate disputes, admiralty cases, and cases where the Unites States is
a party.182 If the underlying suit arises in one of these areas, the settlement

181

Lynch, 279 F.3d at 489.
See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981). Of course, if the
settlement itself is of a case that fits into one of these categories, federal common law should control.
See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (“[O]bligations to and rights of the
United States under its contracts are governed exclusively by federal law.”).
182
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enforcement should be governed by federal common law.183 Otherwise,
settlement of federal cases does not fall within these identified areas;
however, federal common law may still apply provided there is a significant
conflict with a federal policy or interest created by using state law.184
Additionally, the asserted federal interest is much more likely to satisfy the
requirement if it is clearly identifiable and tethered to a federal statute.185
This Part will first describe three federal interests associated with
settlements of federal claims that are sufficient to meet the standards under
Atherton. First, the federal courts have a broad institutional interest in
overseeing their affairs, particularly with respect to such a pervasive
element of modern civil litigation. Second, there is a federal policy in
promoting and achieving the settlement of federal lawsuits. Third, there
may be statute-specific federal policies and interests affected by
settlements. This Part will discuss each interest in turn and will consider the
possibility of significant conflicts that state law could present. These
potential conflicts highlight the situations in which, even if a blanket
application of federal common law is not adopted, federal courts should be
prepared to invoke federal common law to protect the federal policy of
promoting settlements.
A. The Institutional Interests of the Federal Courts in Autonomy and
Overseeing Their Own Affairs
The most significant federal interest implicated by the rules of decision
that federal courts use to adjudicate settlement enforcement proceedings is
the federal courts’ institutional interest in overseeing procedures used to
manage their dockets. Settlement conferences take place in federal district
courts every day. Consequently, disputes about the resulting settlement
183

Where the underlying federal suit was, in fact, brought under one of those categories, some
courts have used federal common law to adjudicate a settlement enforcement proceeding. See, e.g.,
Brewer v. Muscle Shoals Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying federal common
law to a settlement agreement negotiated by the EEOC); Borne v. A & P Boat Rentals No. 4, Inc.,
780 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying federal common law to determine “the validity and
enforceability of agreements settling the rights of a seaman”); Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works,
Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1516 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying federal common law to interpret an executive order
conciliation agreement). Confusingly, however, federal courts do not always use federal common law in
this context. See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 235 F.3d 1211, 1213–15 (10th Cir. 2000) (using state
law to adjudicate a settlement enforcement dispute where the underlying case was one where the United
States was a party); Dillow v. Ashland, Inc., No. 97-6108, 1999 WL 685941, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 24,
1999) (using state substantive law to determine the validity of a settlement agreement where the
underlying claim was one based on admiralty law). Ultimately, this disagreement, along with its origins
and contours, falls outside the focus of this Article. The arguments in favor of federal common law in
settlement disputes involving federal claims also apply to these types of cases. With these cases,
however, the use of federal common law is supported even more so by the fact that the underlying case
is one where courts have already recognized the appropriateness of federal common law.
184
See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 223 (1997).
185
See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994).
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agreements are common. Allowing state law (with its inherent variations) to
dictate the rules applying to settlements of federal claims comes at a great
cost to judicial economy. Uniform federal common law standards would be
much more consistent with these federal interests, allowing the federal
courts to efficiently run their dockets free from the interference of state law.
The federal courts set their own procedural rules for how business is
done within the walls of the courts. From start to finish, there are federal
rules that govern the entire litigation process. Examples of this broad power
include the establishment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
other national rules of procedure and evidence,186 local court rules
applicable to the entire federal district court docket,187 and standing orders
promulgated by a particular judge.188 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
recognized that the federal judiciary has “inherent power[s], governed not
by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of
cases.”189 The federal courts thus have the autonomy to manage the federal
claims that they adjudicate up until those cases purportedly settle, at which
point federal judges are left to determine whether to apply federal or state
law to the settlement disputes before them. The issues governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include pleading, service of process,
motion practice, discovery, trial, judgment, and postjudgment proceedings.
Despite the important role settlement plays in the litigation process, there
are no rules governing settlement. If there ever were a fitting place for
federal common law, the set of rules governing the settlement of federal
claims is it.
Additionally, the federal courts determine the binding effect of the
judgments they enter.190 This was the lesson learned from the Supreme
Court in Semtek. In Semtek, the Court held that federal common law would
determine the preclusive effect of a judgment of a federal court sitting in
diversity.191 The only explanation the Court offered was that the Court had

186

Although Congress does retain veto power over these Rules, they are drafted by officers of the
federal courts, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States, and promulgated by the
Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 333, 2071–2077 (2006).
187
See id. § 2071; 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 23 (2003).
188
See, e.g., Standing Order Setting Settlement Conference, Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow
(Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/JUDGES/DENLOW/MDSCORD.pdf.
189
Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962) (internal quotation marks omitted). Another
example of this authority is that each court controls the admission of attorneys to practice before them
and governs their conduct, despite the fact that attorneys are licensed by individual states. See, e.g.,
LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS LR83.10, at
40–41 (2012), available at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/LocalRules.aspx?rtab=localrule.
190
See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507 (2001).
191
See id.
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long held that federal law controlled the preclusive effect of federal court
judgments in federal question cases.192
The combination of the federal judiciary’s powers over both its internal
procedures and the binding effect of its decisions and judgments implies a
broad institutional interest of the federal judiciary in controlling its own
affairs. Just as the federal courts control how litigants must plead, discover,
motion, and try their cases, the federal courts should control what steps are
necessary to create a binding settlement. Because settlements are crucial to
the everyday affairs of federal courts and greatly impact their operation, the
procedural rules governing how litigants reach settlements are of great
importance to those courts. One would be hard-pressed to identify an area
that is more central to the management of the federal judiciary’s “own
affairs” relating to the achievement of “the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases”193 than the rules pertaining to settlements.
Furthermore, just as federal common law determines the preclusive effect
of federal judgments, federal common law should also have the final say in
deciding the effect of settlements of federal claims that take place within the
federal court system.194 In other words, federal common law should be used
in settlement enforcement proceedings arising out of cases brought under
the court’s federal question jurisdiction.195
The institutional interest of the federal courts in controlling their own
affairs is supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Dice v. Akron,
Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.196 In Dice, the Supreme Court held that
federal common law controlled the validity of a waiver of claims under
FELA.197 But the language and reasoning of Dice was much broader than
that particular statute. The primary concerns of the Dice Court were to
protect the erosion of federal rights by the operation of state law and to

192

See id.
Link, 370 U.S. at 630–31.
194
It is worth noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 specifies that federal common law governs
claims of evidentiary privilege in federal question cases, but that state law governs evidentiary privilege
in diversity cases. FED. R. EVID. 501.
195
The federal question settlement-dispute context is actually more amenable to federal common
law than the issue in Semtek. In the settlement area, the substantive law of the underlying suit is federal,
while in Semtek the underlying substantive law involved state law statutes of limitation. See Semtek,
531 U.S. at 499; Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 116, at 613. The fact that Semtek involved claims
brought under state law may even suggest that federal common law would be justified in settlement
enforcement disputes where the underlying federal jurisdiction is based on diversity. In diversity cases,
the underlying substantive law would be premised on state law, just like in Semtek. But in Semtek, this
aspect did not prevent the Court from using federal common law to address the procedures in federal
courts. Be it the effect of a dismissal or the effect of conduct with respect to settlement, both arguably
involve procedural concerns. This argument, however, extends past the scope of this Article and is an
area ripe for analysis elsewhere.
196
342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952); see supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.
197
342 U.S. at 361.
193
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effectuate the purposes of the statute.198 Furthermore, the Court emphasized
the importance of releases to the administration of FELA.199 This latter point
is related to the institutional interests of federal courts just discussed. The
federal courts are called upon to determine the validity of these releases as
part of their administration of cases brought under FELA.200 The Court was
pointing out that state law could not come into federal courts and disrupt the
federal courts’ administration of the claims before it.
This observation about the administrative aspect of waivers is
analogous to the settlement enforcement proceeding context. For one thing,
a settlement is functionally very similar to a waiver or release. In fact,
settlements often include general releases of other related claims. They are
both means of resolving litigation, one before the case is even brought and
one after the initiation of the claim. But if waivers are important to the
administration of a statute, then settlements are even more important given
the prevalence of settlement as a means of resolving claims under a
particular statute. Given all of the similarities between waivers and
settlements, there is a compelling argument that the institutional interests of
federal courts in controlling their dockets supports the use of federal
common law not only with waivers, but also settlements.
Despite being the most analogous Supreme Court case to the
settlement context and containing a broad allowance for federal common
law when the incidents of federal rights are involved, Dice has had limited
influence over the past fifty years. The Supreme Court has rarely cited the
case; when it has, the case is cited for procedural issues specific to FELA
that are not relevant to settlements.201 Nevertheless, the case remains on the
books with strong language in favor of federal common law should the
Supreme Court someday face this choice of law issue.202
198

See id.
Id.
200
Id.
201
See, e.g., Hogue v. S. Ry. Co., 390 U.S. 516, 517 (1968) (per curiam) (holding that federal rather
than state law controls the issue of whether under FELA a plaintiff must tender back consideration
received for a release when alleging a mistake of act regarding that release in a lawsuit).
202
Some of the more expansive statements from Dice clearly are no longer valid given the modern
shift against federal common law. For one, Dice takes the position that because states could undermine
the federal right to sue created by FELA, federal law controls the validity of waivers. See Dice, 342 U.S.
at 361. But under the modern understanding of the role of federal common law, the abstract possibility
that a federal policy or interest could be undermined by state rule is not enough. A specific state rule that
presents a significant conflict is required before federal common law is justified. See Atherton v. FDIC,
519 U.S. 213, 223 (1997); O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994). Additionally, the Dice
Court invoked the need for “uniform application throughout the country” as a justification for the use of
federal common law, but did not actually analyze the issue. See Dice, 342 U.S. at 361. Under Atherton
and O’Melveny, however, the need for uniformity has to be affirmatively established rather than
assumed.
That being said, we have already seen that the settlement enforcement setting with the federal
interests it implicates can meet these modern standards. Since Dice remains good law, should this issue
199
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The Fourth Circuit has recognized the institutional interest of the
federal courts in controlling settlements, though Dice has not been broadly
extended to settlement enforcement proceedings. Specifically, the court in
Gamewell Manufacturing, Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc. considered whether
federal or state law would control the enforceability of a settlement
agreement of patent infringement claims.203 The court cited Dice204 but
declined to rely on it, instead resolving the choice of law issue on the
premise that “federal procedural interests” in determining whether and
when settlement has been achieved in federal litigation were sufficient to
justify the creation of a federal rule on the issue.205 While the Fourth Circuit
has not relied on the Gamewell case in its recent settlement enforcement
cases,206 a return to respecting the institutional interests of federal courts
would allow the courts the freedom to efficiently manage their affairs.
But it is not enough to say that there is a federal interest in the federal
courts managing themselves. To justify the use of federal common law,
there must be a significant conflict with that interest created by using state
law.207 With respect to the federal interest in federal court independence,
however, the conflict is quite apparent. Requiring the use of state law in
settlement enforcement proceedings creates a fundamental conflict because
to do so would amount to a substantial interference with the federal courts’
autonomy by requiring federal courts to apply the law of fifty different
states. It would be a significant conflict with the nature of the federal court
system.
Furthermore, mandating that the federal courts administer settlements
pursuant to the vagaries and inconsistencies of the laws of different states
creates unnecessary inefficiency. The inefficiencies extend not only to the
judges tasked with presiding over a wide variety of settlements; individual
litigants are also negatively affected. Settlements are an increasingly
important aspect of the vindication of federal rights. Since so much of
federal litigation revolves around the process of negotiating a settlement,
the rules governing those settlements will shape how litigants interact with
each other and how courts interact with the litigants. For these rules to vary
from courthouse to courthouse, and even from case to case before a single
ever reach the Supreme Court, the Court would have an existing opinion permitting federal common law
in a situation highly analogous to settlement.
203
715 F.2d 112, 113–14 (4th Cir. 1983).
204
Id. at 114. While the court cited Dice, it did not rely on Dice or determine whether Dice
controlled; rather, the Gamewell court found a separate basis for using federal law.
205
Id. at 115–16.
206
See Moore v. Beaufort Cnty., N.C., 936 F.2d 159, 162 (4th Cir. 1991); Piver v. Pender Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1083 (4th Cir. 1987). But see Silicon Image, Inc. v. Genesis Microchip, Inc.,
271 F. Supp. 2d 840, 848 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that federal law controlled a settlement enforcement
proceeding where the underlying claim was a patent infringement action and citing Gamewell as
controlling authority).
207
See Atherton, 519 U.S. at 218–19.
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judge,208 leads to unnecessary confusion and inconsistency. The independent
and self-regulating nature of the federal courts justifies the use of federal
common law to avoid these ill effects. These problems go to the heart of the
federal judiciary and thus the federal government. In fact, since this conflict
with state law directly affects the basic operation of the courts, its
significance is even more pronounced than the tort liability of federal
contractors, a potential conflict with federal interests that the Supreme
Court deemed significant enough to support the creation of federal common
law.209 The importance of the uniform rules is recognized in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which establish uniform federal rules for
pleadings, discovery, motions, and trial rather than looking to state law.210
In light of these basic conflicts with using state law, the most effective
remedy would be to implement a uniform federal common law governing
settlements. It is hard to imagine that a federal judge overseeing a federal
lawsuit would have to engage in a choice of law analysis and then apply
different (and inconsistent) state laws every time he or she was either
assisting in the settling of cases or adjudicating a dispute regarding those
settlements. Since the use of state law is antithetical to the federal interest
that the federal courts have in controlling their own courtrooms and
dockets, the only viable solution is for courts to use federal common law,
for Congress to adopt a statute, or to add a section on settlement to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.211
It is important to note that this argument for uniform federal rules is
not a general appeal to uniformity for uniformity’s sake—“that most
generic (and lightly invoked) of alleged federal interests.”212 Federal courts
critically assess claims for the need of a uniform federal rule213 and “reject
generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that
adopting state law would adversely affect” the federal interest.214 Here, the
208

A single federal judge with a diverse docket could easily have diversity cases in front of it
governed by the law of different states where, applying state law to settlement enforcement proceedings,
different rules would apply. Compare TEX. R. CIV. P. 11 (“Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no
agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in
writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and
entered of record.”), with Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2002)
(explaining how “[t]he enforceability of oral settlements is . . . the general rule, not something peculiar
to Illinois though it has been changed by statute or court rule in some states” (citations omitted)).
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See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–06 (1988).
210
The only area in which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure defer to state procedure is in the
execution of judgments. FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a).
211
The purpose of this Article is to propose several solutions to the problem currently confronting
the federal courts. Whether an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be possible
under 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006), which states that “rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right,” is beyond the scope of this Article.
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O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1994).
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See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 219–20 (1997).
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United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979).
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uniform rule serves the institutional interests of the federal courts; the
interest at stake is the institutional interest in the autonomy of federal
courts. Uniformity is simply the means to best protect this interest and
should not be confused with the interest itself.
Nor can one make the argument that the federal courts have thrived
despite having to use state law for disputes concerning the settlement of
federal claims. This was the argument that the Supreme Court used to reject
the claim of a significant conflict in Atherton: the banking system has
thrived despite varying rules pertaining to corporate governance.215 But in
the settlement enforcement context, the conflict with the institutional
interests of the federal courts is not simply a matter of efficiency. The
federal courts are accorded independence in our government to handle their
own procedures and dockets.216 Thus, whether or not the federal courts are
“thriving” (however one might assess such a concept) is irrelevant—the
conflict exists without reference to the functioning of the courts. In
Atherton, the Court used the success of the banking industry to defeat
claims for the need for uniformity in laws governing the liability of bank
officers.217 But in the settlement context this argument is not simply for
uniformity for uniformity’s sake, as discussed in the preceding paragraph.
To be sure, there is an efficiency facet to the institutional interests of the
federal courts. It is hard to argue that the federal courts would not greatly
benefit from simplification of the settlement process. Any person familiar
with the federal court system, even on a superficial level, is aware of the
crowded dockets that federal judges face. Giving judges a uniform federal
common law of settlements to deal with the settlement of all federal law
claims would help relieve the burden on the federal court system. That
being said, it is the independence of the courts in overseeing their own
affairs that is the primary basis for instituting federal common law, with the
gains in efficiency being an ancillary (but significant) benefit.218
B. Protecting the Federal Interest in Encouraging Settlements on a
Rule-by-Rule Basis
The second federal interest that supports the use of federal common
law in settlement enforcement proceedings is the federal policy of
promoting settlement of the cases before them. The Alternative Dispute
Resolution statute embodies a very strong federal interest in the process of
settlement and in the promotion of settlement as a means of resolving
215

Atherton, 519 U.S. at 220.
See U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing that the judiciary is a separate and co-equal branch of
government); see also §§ 2071–2077 (establishing the rulemaking authority of the Supreme Court).
These statutes reflect that courts should control what happens before them, with some congressional
oversight.
217
Atherton, 519 U.S. at 220.
218
See, e.g., §§ 2071–2077.
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litigation.219 That statute requires that all federal district courts “devise and
implement [their] own alternative dispute resolution program . . . to
encourage and promote the use of alternative dispute resolution in [their]
district[s].”220 Courts that had such programs in effect at the time the statute
was enacted were to assess the effectiveness of the programs and improve
them to be consistent with the statute.221
In addition, it is well recognized among the federal courts that there is
a strong policy in favor of settlements.222 Settlements are encouraged
because of the benefits realized in both judicial economy through the
clearing of increasingly crowded dockets and in the expense saved by
litigants.223 For this reason, a federal court can direct parties in civil
litigation to attend a settlement conference224 and sanction attorneys or
parties for failure to obey such an order.225 Furthermore, Federal Rule of
Evidence 408, which holds that offers to settle and statements made during
settlement negotiations are inadmissible in court, was created to promote
the public policy in favor of resolving disputes.226
There are a number of significant conflicts with the federal interest in
promoting settlements that potentially arise if state law is used in enforcing
settlements. Unlike the institutional interest discussed above, however, the
interest in promoting settlement cannot support uniform federal rules for
every settlement issue that might arise in an enforcement proceeding.
Instead, state law conflicts with the federal interest in settlements on a ruleby-rule basis. The next subsection will discuss a number of important areas
where state variation on important contract principles arguably encumbers
the settlement process in the federal courts.
1.
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promoting settlement of federal claims requires protection on a rule-by-rule
basis. State contract law principles potentially restrict settlements and thus
conflict with that policy. This necessitates that federal courts remain
vigilant when asked to enforce settlement agreements, ensuring that
whatever state laws they would apply to the settlements do not actually
present such a conflict. Where they do, the court should apply a federal
common law rule that aligns with the federal policy favoring settlements.
Several variations in state law and conflicts between state and federal
contract law will readily affect settlement enforcement disputes. One
example is the validity of oral settlements. Several states deny the validity
of oral settlements,227 while most states228 and federal common law229 hold
that oral settlements are enforceable. It is hard to imagine an issue more
basic to the process of settlement and the agreements resulting from that
process than whether agreements must be in writing. The federal courts
should determine which of these positions is most consistent with the
federal policy of promoting settlements or a federal rule of civil procedure
should be adopted to embrace one rule.
Authority to settle is another rule, central to settlements, on which
jurisdictions differ. The states vary widely on issues of when an attorney
has authority to settle and the scope of that authority, including: (1) creating
a rebuttable presumption that an attorney has express authority to settle,230

227

See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 11 (“Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement between
attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed
with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of record.”);
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 671 So. 2d 315, 317–18 (La. 1996) (holding that under Louisiana law, in order for a
settlement to be valid, it must be recited in open court or reduced to writing); Melucci v. Berthod,
687 A.2d 878, 879 (R.I. 1997) (per curiam) (same, under Rhode Island law).
228
See, e.g., Dillard v. Starcon Int’l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2007) (Illinois law); Yuen v.
Bank of China, 151 F. App’x 106, 107 (3d Cir. 2005) (New Jersey law); see also Lynch, Inc. v.
SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The enforceability of oral settlements is . . . the
general rule, not something peculiar to Illinois, though it has been changed by statute or court rule in
some states.” (citations omitted)).
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See Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 246 F.3d 11, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2001).
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See, e.g., Amin v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 951 F.2d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (applying federal
common law and concluding that “[a]n attorney retained for litigation purposes is presumed to possess
express authority to enter into a settlement agreement on behalf of the client, and the client bears the
burden of rebutting this presumption with affirmative proof that the attorney lacked settlement
authority”); Villanueva v. CNA Ins. Cos., 868 F.2d 684, 686 (5th Cir. 1989) (“In Louisiana, attorneys
are presumed to have authority to negotiate settlement agreements for their clients. Absent evidence that
the client’s consent was not clear and express, the agreement is binding.” (citation omitted)); Clark v.
City of Zebulon, 156 F.R.D. 684, 692 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (“It is clear that under Georgia law, an attorney
has apparent authority to enter into settlement agreements on behalf of his client. Therefore, in the
absence of knowledge of express restrictions on an attorney’s authority, other settling parties may
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(2) requiring express authority,231 (3) requiring authority to settle to be
conferred in writing,232 (4) allowing a client to give his lawyer apparent
authority through communication with opposing counsel,233 and
(5) requiring clear and convincing evidence of express, actual authority.234
Much like whether a party can make a binding oral settlement,
knowing who has the authority to settle a case and the scope of that
authority are fundamental issues to the law of settlements. On one extreme
is the rule that attorneys are presumed to have the authority to settle a
case.235 On the opposite extreme is the Hawaii rule that requires express
written consent before an attorney can settle a case.236 A federal court could
conclude that one of the rules that fall somewhere in between these two
extremes does not rise to the level of a significant conflict with the federal
policy in favor of settlement. However, the Hawaii rule and other more
extreme rules may create a conflict that rises to that level. In the same way
that courts use a uniform rule for pleading or discovery, the issues of
authority to settle and whether settlement must be in writing are
fundamental and require a uniform rule.
A third example of an issue that can arise in settlement enforcements is
the standard of proof required to rescind an agreement based on fraud or
mutual mistake. Illinois law, for example, requires clear and convincing
evidence to rescind a settlement on the basis of fraud or mutual mistake.237
Not all states, however, require that the evidence be clear and convincing in
order to rescind.238 A state rule that more readily justifies rescission of a
settlement by reason of mutual mistake may conflict with the federal policy
in favor of settlement of federal claims. While this scenario may arise less
231

See, e.g., Jago v. Special Needs Home Health Care, 190 S.W.3d 352, 353 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006)
(“The law is clear that express client authority must be had to enter into a settlement agreement, and
apparent authority is insufficient.”).
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See Cook v. Surety Life Ins., Co., 903 P.2d 708, 714 (Haw. Ct. App. 1995) (“[N]o practitioner
shall have power to compromise, arbitrate, or settle such matters confided to the practitioner, unless
upon special authority in writing from the practitioner’s client.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 605-7 (LexisNexis 1985))).
233
See, e.g., Farris v. JC Penney Co., 176 F.3d 706, 712 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Pennsylvania law
and concluding that apparent authority can be created by a client’s communication with opposing
counsel).
234
See, e.g., Linardos v. Lilley, 590 So. 2d 1064, 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam)
(requiring a “clear and unequivocal grant of authority to appellant’s attorney to settle this case” as a
precondition to enforcing purported settlement (internal quotation mark omitted)).
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See supra text accompanying note 230.
236
See supra text accompanying note 232.
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See Dunlap v. Chi. Osteopathic Hosp., No. 92-3813, 1995 WL 94876, at *1 (7th Cir. Mar. 7,
1995).
238
See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buckallew, 685 N.W.2d 675, 681 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)
(applying Michigan contract law to a claim for rescission of a settlement agreement and analyzing the
issue without reference to a clear and convincing standard, but citing cases that require “satisfactory
evidence,” such as Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 67 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Mich. 1954)).
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frequently than the previous two, it shows how even small and generally
unanticipated legal rules that settlements can implicate can negatively affect
the federal policy in favor of settlement.
This discussion only examines cases where rules currently in place
may conflict. But federal courts are not limited to picking between an
existing state contract law and the federal common law of contracts as it
currently exists. Provided a significant conflict exists,239 and because federal
policy is at stake, a federal court could create entirely new federal common
law principles that are even more attentive to the federal interest, or a
federal rule could be adopted which would eliminate potential
inconsistencies among courts attempting to create the federal common law.
2. What Is a Significant Conflict?.—While settlement rules can
clearly conflict with the federal policy of promoting settlements, it is less
clear when a conflict between a federal policy or interest and the use of a
state rule of decision reaches the level of significance necessary to justify
the use of federal common law. Based on how courts have analyzed the
issue, there is no hard and fast answer. The analysis is highly specific to the
federal interest at stake and the way the challenged state rule affects that
interest. In many cases, there simply is a conflict or there is not, and there is
not a principle that can be generalized to future cases.240 Nevertheless, a
couple of principles can be gleaned from some of the cases addressing
significant conflict claims. If the federal interest at stake is adequately
protected through other legal rules, the court may find the displacement of
state law unnecessary.241 The court may also find a federal common law rule
unnecessary where such a rule could not protect the federal interest any
more than state law rules can.242
One example of a situation in which federal common law was not
required to protect identifiable federal interests is seen in Museum of Fine
Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, where a museum brought an action for a
declaratory judgment that the defendant’s claims to a piece of art in its
collection were time-barred.243 The defendant was claiming a right to the
artwork because the Nazi German regime forced her family to sell it.244 The
significant conflict analysis revolved around the defendant’s argument that
the court should displace the state law statute of limitations that would bar
the defendant’s claims to the art with a federal common law laches
239

See Ciaramella v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 131 F.3d 320, 322–23 (2d Cir. 1997).
See, e.g., Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2009) (identifying a
direct conflict between state and federal law regarding the authorization of the transfer of a copyright
license, but not analyzing “significance” in a less direct conflict).
241
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See, e.g., Mason & Dixon Intermodal, Inc. v. Lapmaster Int’l LLC, 632 F.3d 1056, 1062–63 (9th
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defense.245 The defendant argued that there was a compelling federal
interest in ensuring charitable organizations such as the Museum provide
the public with the benefits for which their tax exemptions were granted.246
The defendant argued that museums such as the plaintiff had failed to
investigate the artwork they acquired and thus had undermined the basis for
their tax exemption by facilitating commerce in stolen artwork.247 As a
result, the defendant argued, the federal courts are justified in using federal
common law in lawsuits seeking to reclaim Nazi-confiscated artworks.
The First Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that there was a
significant conflict with federal policies concerning tax exempt
organizations that required the use of federal common law in that instance.
The court reasoned that there were many other means through which taxexempt organizations were made accountable to the public interest. For one,
they are subject to state law, such as employment law and fiduciary duties,
the latter of which would protect against accusations such as the ones the
defendant made.248 Additionally, an organization may lose its tax-exempt
status should it shirk its duties and be subject to criminal and civil penalties
for various other abuses.249 The court concluded that “[t]he federal interest
in ensuring that tax-exempt organizations ‘demonstrably serve and be in
harmony with the public interest’ is adequately protected through these
mechanisms and others.”250 As a result, no further federal common law rules
were necessary to protect the federal interest in tax exempt organizations.251
Thus, there was a recognized federal interest to protect, but the court
determined that alternate protection was in place via state law and other
mechanisms.
The argument that there is not a significant conflict because the federal
interest at issue is adequately protected in other ways does not apply to the
settlement enforcement context. There is no alternative scheme that protects
the federal interest in encouraging settlements. The real threat against the
settlement of cases comes not from the actions of individuals (putting aside
obstinate litigants), but from rules and procedures that undermine
settlement. Nothing other than contract rules related to settlement
agreements are capable of upholding the federal interest in promoting
settlements because these are the rules that determine whether there is a
settlement. Nor can one say that state contract law will adequately provide
an alternate protective scheme to the interest in settlements. For all of the
contract rules on which the states vary, one rule must, as a matter of federal
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
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policy, best support the settlement of federal claims. For example, regarding
the validity of oral settlements, federal courts should embrace the rule that
they find to be protective of the interest in settling federal claims. Leaving
state law to determine the validity of settlements of federal claims simply
leaves the law in its current problematic state. Therefore, the alternate
protection basis of Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, which meant that federal
common law was not required to protect the particular federal interest, is
inapplicable to the significant conflict analysis in the settlement context.
In settlement enforcement proceedings, there may well be certain
contract principles that will not have an impact on the federal interest in
promoting settlements one way or the other. In such circumstances, the use
of federal common law as the rule of decision would not be justified. An
example of this would be where a court was asked to interpret a specific
term in the settlement agreement. Regardless of what the court takes that
term to mean, it will not cause there to be more or fewer settlements. For
example, courts vary on how they interpret provisions for the payment of
costs when they are included in settlement agreements.252 But regardless of
how a settlement dispute about such a term would be resolved by a court, it
would not promote or hinder the federal policy in favor of settlements. On
the other hand, the issues discussed above, particularly in the area of
contract formation, such as the authority to settle and the validity of oral
settlement, certainly will have the possibility of hindering the federal policy
in favor of settlements. Therefore, rules pertaining to these issues are
capable of creating a significant conflict with that policy and are ripe for
federal common law rules.
C. Federal Common Law Control of Settlements on a
Statute-by-Statute Analysis
Even if the arguments for across-the-board use of federal law failed,253
there would still be arguments to be made for each individual federal statute
based on the policies and interests implicated by that specific statute. This
was the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Ciaramella.254 When the
defendant–appellee urged the court to fashion a federal common law rule
finding a binding oral settlement whenever the parties’ attorneys agreed on
all material terms, the court’s significant conflict analysis focused on the
specific underlying statutes.255 The court did not address any broader federal
interest in settlements of federal claims in general, whether premised on
uniformity or simply the policy of encouraging settlements. The court
looked at both the ADA and ERISA, finding in the ADA an explicit policy
252
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253
See supra Part II.A.
254
Ciaramella v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 131 F.3d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1997).
255
See id. at 322–23.

165

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

in favor of voluntary settlement.256 The defendant–appellee’s argument
failed where the state law and existing federal common law rule257 did not
actually conflict with this federal policy.258
As Ciaramella demonstrates, the analysis under this statute-by-statute
approach would vary depending on the specific source of the federal
lawsuit. Arguments would be based on the specific language and legislative
histories of the individual statute at stake in that case and would therefore
be hard to anticipate. One form this argument might take mirrors that in
Ciaramella, that the specific statute—the ADA in that case—encourages
voluntary settlements.259 Another federal statute with an identifiable policy
in favor of settlement is Title VII.260
There may also be other statute-specific policies that would be
threatened by the use of state law to interpret settlement agreements. For
any given federal statute, there could potentially be some unique policy or
interest advanced by that particular statute that requires that federal law
control all settlements under that statute. To hold otherwise would expose
those policies and interests to possible erosion by the states.261 Such a
rationale has been recognized by at least one court as possibly applying to
any federal remedial statute created to rectify historical inequalities in
bargaining power, such as racial minorities under § 1983 or employees
subject to discrimination under Title VII.262 If federal common law found
valid settlements in situations where state contract law would not (in the
context of oral settlement agreements, for example), such a conflict could
result in a party being adversely affected by the use of state law in
settlement of federal question claims. A federal court would be justified in
creating a federal common law rule to supplant any state law rule that
served to upset the protections or remedies envisioned by a federal statute.
Even if the Supreme Court were to conclude that the institutional
interests of the federal courts do not justify the blanket use of federal
256
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common law in settlement enforcement disputes where the underlying
claim arose under federal law, federal interests demand consideration in
settlement agreements. There may be statute-specific policies that require
applying federal common law. A federal court must weigh these interests,
and the various threats to them presented by state law, when deciding
whether a federal common law rule is necessary.
CONCLUSION
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, federal common law should
only displace state law where there is a significant conflict between the use
of state law and a federal policy or interest. The federal courts have a
clearly identifiable institutional interest in managing their own procedures
and dockets. This interest can be deduced from the federal courts’ broad
powers to set the procedures governing all aspects of litigation as it unfolds
both within and outside the courtroom. Supreme Court precedent permitting
the use of federal common law on issues related to in-court procedures
further supports this federal interest. Any time a settlement stemming from
a federal claim is before a federal judge, that judge should not have to parse
through different legal rules or choice of law principles. A uniform federal
common law of settlements in this situation should be adopted.
Additionally, there is a clearly identifiable federal interest in promoting
settlements widely recognized by the federal courts and embodied by the
federal Alternative Dispute Resolution statute. The undeniable federal
policy in favor of settlement demands that federal courts conduct a case-bycase inquiry each time a settlement enforcement dispute is before them to
ensure that the state rule at issue does not significantly conflict with that
federal policy. This issue will likely have a significant conflict, particularly
in the areas of oral settlements and authority to settle. Federal courts should
not permit state contract rules that place restrictions on settlements to
undermine the interest in the resolution of federal claims. Additionally,
there may be statute-specific federal interests that require the use of federal
law in settlements of claims brought under those statutes.
Recognition by federal courts of the various federal interests at stake in
settlement enforcement proceedings will lead to much needed stability in
this ever-important area of law. Given the prevalence of settlements in our
civil litigation system, the rules that govern the disputes that inevitably arise
from the settlement process are of paramount importance. Federal courts
confronted with settlement enforcement disputes should apply federal
common law. An efficient and direct route to the necessary uniformity
would be to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to add a section on
settlement, though the Article acknowledges potential challenges for this
possibility.263 In the meantime, practitioners can minimize confusion by
263

See supra note 18.
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including choice of law provisions in their settlement agreements. It is time
that federal courts realize that the choice of law decisions that they
presently rely on do not accurately reflect current Supreme Court doctrine.
Once they pass this hurdle, they can ensure that the federal interests
impacted by settlements of federal claims are adequately protected by
adopting and implementing a federal common law of settlements for all
federal question cases.
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